



Background and stakes

# Christ Roi

of an urban development project


in the Port-au-Prince metropolis



October 2017







2015

2016

2017

16/11/2015

**Amendment 3:** extension of project duration to 39 months

*October 2015: end of the position of Urban Coordinator*

*2 positions of WaSH managers, one for the technical component, the other for the social component*

18/03/2016

**Amendment 4:** extension of the project duration to 48 months

13/12/2016

**Amendment 5:** extension of the project duration to 56 months

*January 2016: arrival of a unique Urban Programme Manager for the 3 poles of the project (infrastructures, water and sanitation and community approach)*

*March 2016: end of the position of Urban Coordinator Assistant*

30/08/2017

Closing ceremony of the project

August - November 2014  
Community projects

12/11/14  
Inauguration of the Bas Norgues sports field

02/12/14  
Contract signed with LUPP HAITI SA and the MTPTC for the ravine works

17/09/14  
Opening of the masonry training centre

30/03/15  
Signature of a Memorandum of Understanding with the City Council on the compensation procedures for owners

January - July 2015  
1<sup>st</sup> phase of the ravine works with LUPP HAITI S.A.

11/08/15  
Amicable termination of the contract with LUPP HAITI S.A.

09/10/15  
Launch of a new call for tenders

September 2015 - February 2016  
2<sup>nd</sup> phase of construction of sanitation solutions

December 2014 - January 2016  
Construction, reinforcement and extension of housing

January 2014 - December 2015  
Support of project holders

January - March 2016  
Construction of Maxi courtyard

20/04/16  
Signature of the contract with SECCA Ingénierie S.A. and the MTPTC

May 2016 - August 2017  
2<sup>nd</sup> phase of the ravine works with SECCA Ingénierie S.A.



Precise dates



Activity phases

## SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONAL in Haiti from 2010 to 2012

SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONAL (SI) returned to Haiti in 2010 following the earthquake of January 12, 2010 and the colossal needs of the inhabitants of Port-au-Prince, notably with a response in the Bristout-Bobin and Christ Roi IDP sites. Specifically intervening first on an emergency response in the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WaSH) sector, SI then undertook longer-term activities in 2011 in Bristout-Bobin via a pilot project to **support the return process of displaced populations to their neighbourhood of origin** ("ARQ" programme in French), through support for both IDP sites and the improvement of conditions in the district.

This ARQ programme, funded by ECHO with €3.5 million over a ten-month period, had several components: debris clearance (in the form of Cash for Work), local capacity building (especially in terms of reducing the risk of natural disasters), distribution of non-food items to displaced persons, mitigation works in high-risk areas and improved access to WaSH.

In 2012, activities were reoriented towards Christ Roi district, where SI had already carried out excavation and sanitation operations between 2010 and 2011<sup>1</sup>. This second phase of the project aimed at **promoting the return of displaced populations to their original neighbourhoods by improving their financial capacities** (creation of small businesses, training, etc.) **and the sanitation situation of the neighbourhood** (rehabilitation of the drainage network, construction of private latrines, water kiosks), as well as the security of the neighbourhood (gabion protection and retaining walls).

Thanks to remaining funding available from ECHO in mid-2012, SI was able to finance an **urban study** aimed at preparing the implementation of an urban reconstruction and rehabilitation

project in the Christ Roi district. This diagnosis of the district, carried out according to a participatory methodology from April to June 2012, laid the groundwork for a development plan and made it possible to initiate discussions with the institutions and to know their vision for the development of the district. Based on this urban study, or "Neighbourhood Profile"<sup>2</sup>, SI was able to build a real **urban intervention strategy** by integrating responses to the humanitarian needs identified by SI, the needs expressed by the population and the vision of the institutions for the development of the district. This urban intervention strategy then fed into the writing of a project integrating intervention axes consensual to the inhabitants of the district and the institutions.

The **integrated project for the reconstruction, urban planning and economic development of the Christ Roi district** was launched in January 2013. Its implementation, scheduled for an initial duration of three years, was financed by **EuropeAid** under the PARAQ fund (**Neighbourhood Reconstruction and Development Support Programme**).

1. Problems of community outreach deteriorated the dialogue between SI teams and area leaders. The revolt of these people pushed SI to withdraw from Bristout-Bobin and concentrate its future actions in Christ Roi neighborhood.
2. The Neighbourhood Profile (i) assesses the structural strengths and weaknesses of the neighbourhood and (ii) describes household vulnerabilities. This 60-page document was produced in partnership with the urban planners and cartographers of Fondation Architectes de l'Urgence (FAU). It was translated into Creole and disseminated in the field. The Neighbourhood Profile is available in the attached folder (in French only).



## “Build back better” in an urban context: the need for a territorial approach

First of all, we have to take into account the particular context in which SI reopened a mission in 2010: the 2010 earthquake, with more than 300,000 dead, 300,000 wounded and over one million homeless, completely destroyed the capital. After an initial emergency phase to relieve the victims and clear the streets, an intense reconstruction phase began. The density of the conurbation, the complexity of the dynamics involved and the precariousness of many neighbourhoods led to a certain wake-up call: reconstruction had to be seen from the perspective of an urban approach, favouring planning and going beyond the sole construction of buildings without an integrated and holistic vision of the problems. A paradigm shift towards coherent, organised and structuring reconstruction was needed. The mission thus initiated a reflection linking emergency and development in such a context. SI's aim was to continue to use its skills for reconstruction and to meet immediate vital needs, while integrating the structural problems the capital was facing. **To build back better, a territorial approach, an intervention at the neighbourhood level was necessary. The urban response was the only possible way to meet basic needs.**

In parallel to this internal reflection, which resulted in an initial study conducted by architects Simon Deprez and Eléonore Labattut, a reflection was also carried out with other NGOs present in other neighbourhoods (Care, Concern Worldwide, Welthungerhilfe, CRF, etc.) who had similar reflections. **It was now impossible to intervene in reconstruction without thinking about the long term, and hence urban planning.**

The European Union, then in discussions with the NGOs there and as a stakeholder in the ongoing reflections, chose to focus its support on structural, institutional, technical and capacity issues in a logical and well-considered way. Reconstruction went hand in hand with development. In order to do so, it gave priority to the neighbourhoods in which it had already funded NGOs via ECHO.

Urban planning indeed requires very good knowledge of a neighbourhood, its dynamics, stakes, power relations, groups of inhabitants and so on. SI, sharing the same understanding, carried out an initial diagnosis of Christ Roi neighborhood in 2012.

EU's PARAQ programme to support neighbourhood reconstruction and development supported 8 NGOs in 10 neighbourhoods in the capital with a **common strategy of supporting institutions and communities for shared development**. For each of these districts, this programme aimed at drawing up development plans, consolidating them and, in a second phase, making them operational. These development plans not only allowed PARAQ operators to be more coherent and relevant in their choice of intervention, but also to provide a coherent framework for the future development of the neighbourhood and the infrastructures that an NGO or any other stakeholder would later wish to rehabilitate or build.

For SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONALE, the reflections on reconstruction, planning and development were new. They enabled SI to rethink its modes of intervention and operation, which is essential in view of the crisis contexts that tend to worsen and that increasingly affect urban environments. The lessons learned from this experience at Christ Roi are thus formative and a real opportunity to rethink the operating framework of SI in an urban environment.

3. Deprez, S. et Labattut, E. [2011]. *La reconstruction de Port-au-Prince : analyses et réflexions sur les stratégies d'intervention en milieu urbain*. SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONALE

# The urban

# approach



## Strengths and successes

- **Strong collaboration with the public authorities:** the Ministry of Public Works (MTPTC) and the Municipality (via the local technical agency, in charge of planning and land management issues). The work plan put in place clearly and formally established the roles and responsibilities of each party and allowed these institutions to play a formal and formal role.
- **Added value of the dialogue and reflections engaged with other PARAQ operators** (Concern, Care, CRF, Welthungerhilfe), particularly in the design and early implementation. The coordination made it possible to conduct a joint reflection on the problems encountered and the solutions found, to define common strategies and to be a source of proposals for the State institutions, making it possible to identify the public interlocutors to contact and to better anticipate the working relations to be set up with them. All in all, this boosted the effectiveness of SI's action.
- **Reflection and preparation of the communication strategy prior to the official launch of the project:** this reflection allowed for the establishment of bases of communication, essential before starting any work with the community.
- **The first urban study was conducted out by two architect and urban planner consultants:** this document allowed for the construction of an urban intervention strategy that responded both to the humanitarian needs identified by the population and to the vision of the institutions for the development of the district in relation to the urban planning of the metropolis.
- **Exploratory consultation work in the neighbourhood:** this work gave SI a good knowledge of the environment, stakeholders' interactions and issues, which greatly facilitated its intervention afterwards.
- **Synergies with other organisations based in the district** (Catholic Relief Services, Global Communities, Pan American Development Foundation...): the development plan served as a reference point for bringing together the activities of all these stakeholders.
- **Sustained presence in the neighbourhood:** despite the interruption between ECHO and EuropeAid, two members of the capacity building team on the previous project remained in Christ Roi so that SI could keep an entry point in the neighbourhood and the relationship with the inhabitants would not be suspended.


## Limits and challenges

- The **collaboration and involvement of civil servants depends very much on the personal relations** established between them and the NGO, their availability and their interest in the project activities. Their lack of resources and means can hamper the effective implementation of activities. Moreover, political and administrative instability is problematic: changes of cabinet within state institutions can take place without the continuity of commitments between former and new members.
- This **multi-year project, little known and mastered by SI, required a different intervention framework** than those to which SI is accustomed. SI was able to call on urban planning experts (study on reconstruction in 2011) to help its positioning and to take stock of how to intervene in urban contexts in crisis. However, certain institutional rigidities (particularly in terms of procedures) sometimes hampered the smooth running of activities.
- **Many operational and strategic hesitations** may have delayed some activities, particularly in relation to housing and on the procedure to free the rights of way of the ravine (a gully in Haiti). These hesitations and the lack of a global vision of the project were partly due to too high turnover and a concentration of decisions to be taken on the different expertises in the hands of one unique person. Coupled with this, the lack of coordination between partners at certain points in the project (especially after the suspension of the Urban Coordinator position at the end of 2015) also contributed to the delay in the implementation schedule.

# A multi-stakeholder project consolidated by the strong involvement of inhabitants and institutions

## Stakeholders

## of the project





# planning

Activities implemented by the FAU and SI

Achievements:

30 participatory workshops with 111 referring inhabitants  
1 development plan

“ With the elaboration of the development plan, it was necessary to realise that humanitarian action can profoundly and lastingly change the functioning of the territory and that it is important to place it within the framework of a political vision.

- Silvère Jarrot, Urban Coordinator from January 2013 to May 2014

2011

In 2011 and 2012, the mission conducts in-depth discussions to develop a new urban analysis.

2012

In October 2011, two consultants carry out an analysis of the urban fabric and reconstruction mechanisms. This study provides a fresh look at the needs, and confirms SI's need to reflect on a real urban intervention strategy by integrating the humanitarian needs identified by SI, the needs and aspirations expressed by the inhabitants and the vision of the institutions for the development of the district.

Between August and November 2012, SI conducts an **urban study** in the Christ Roi neighbourhood as part of the integrated programmes implemented for the return to the neighbourhoods. This participatory diagnosis lays the foundations of a development plan.

## Urban study

This document includes a participatory diagnosis and development strategies for the Christ Roi neighbourhood, identified through community mapping workshops, survey work and information gathering.

2013

### April – July 2013: participatory workshops to elaborate the development plan

With the support and respect for institutional prerogatives, participatory workshops are once again organised to consult the community (referring inhabitants) on the identification of the main orientations for the development of the district, and to propose a consensual urban intervention strategy.

### 19 July 2013: presentation of the development axes to the inhabitants

The results of the community planning study, with the main development axes of the district and the priority projects identified, are presented to the inhabitants of Christ Roi.

### 20 September 2013: validation of planning documents by the technical committee

The development and sanitation plans are presented to the technical committee headed by CIAT and composed of representatives of the Port-au-Prince City Council, the Ministry of the Environment, UCLBP, DINEPA and CIAT (*see the acronyms at the end of the document*). The purpose of this inter-ministerial committee is to bring together the authorities responsible for spatial planning and development and to guide actions by ensuring territorial cohesion. The approval of the two plans by this technical committee in order to formalise them is the first step in making them “force of law” and operational through a municipal decree.



## Strengths and good practices

- **Coherent urban reconstruction project:** it had a real leverage effect for the district, thanks to the participatory development plan built and validated by institutional actors.
- **Presence of SI in the district and strong community approach component since 2010:** this facilitated its acceptance.
- **First urban diagnosis of the neighbourhood:** it provided SI with a good knowledge of the dynamics in progress, the stakeholder relationships and power struggles. This type of detailed analysis of the territory is all the more important because it concerns long-term urban development projects. A great deal of mediation work needs to be done to reflect the different levels of interest and aspirations of residents and institutions: this is where urban and community expertise was a real asset.
- **Citizen training component of the workshops:** the participatory workshops enabled participants to understand the why and how of urban management and to better understand their territory and its challenges. From this stemmed the development of a sense of common interest<sup>4</sup>.
- **Popularisation of land planning:** the use of cartographic tools allowed the participants of the workshops to locate important elements and to visualise the different development proposals.
- **Remuneration of the referring inhabitants:** they were considered as “experts” of their neighbourhood. Urban planning is a real job that requires a lot of participation and deserves to be rewarded.

## Lessons learned

- **The development plans are a first step** in the direction of a more complete master development plan implemented at the municipality level. NGOs can play an early role in structuring development.
- **Some technical studies should have been carried out in parallel with the implementation of the consultation workshops** in order to save time and to have at this stage an initial idea of the size of the project and budget required.
- **Participatory workshops provide two sources of added value:** an urban planning component and a social engineering component.
- **Clearly define the roles of each stakeholder in urban planning.** The communities participate in the elaboration of an urban analysis and propose projects, but they do not ultimately decide which worksites will be carried out by the project. The participants in the consultation thus worked on the main areas of development desired for the district, and SI then helped to translate them into projects. Subsequently, the institutions arbitrated and approved or disapproved on the projects

## Difficulties

- **The development plan was validated technically, but not politically:** four years after its validation, it has still not been the subject of a municipal decision to ratify it.
- **Temporalities were sometimes badly adjusted:** delays were made at the beginning of the project to carry out the participatory workshops (they only started in April, four months after the beginning of the project). This time frame created expectations within the community as the project was launched in March without any activities being in the process. There are also difficulties linked to the lack of continuity of the institutions: the change of interlocutors following the municipal elections in 2016 did not allow the same continuity of collaboration with the Port-au-Prince City Council.
- **Misunderstandings and disagreement on the methodology** to be used to conduct participatory planning between the FAU in charge of the workshops and SI, which had a major impact on the activity timeline.

4. This observation must be nuanced: the notion of “community” is to be taken with caution in Haiti’s urban environment and it is therefore perhaps too strong to speak of sustainable awareness of the common good and “community”.

## Participatory

### planning





# approach



## Strengths and good practices

- Reflection with an urban planner consultant and a team of Haitian sociologists upstream of the project led to the **development of the community approach and communication plans within the team**: urban and community expertise was placed at the centre and at the service of the various technical fields.
- **The development at the very beginning of the project of a communication manual** to clearly define communication with the community about the project. This basic tool and the communication schemes between SI teams and the community allowed a real mastery of communication.
- **The important reflection on the issues of representation of the inhabitants**: opening the community consultation to all interested inhabitants and choosing not to work with community platforms. The decision to have referring inhabitants<sup>5</sup> and the fact that we did not choose the most legitimate people to represent the community ourselves prevented us from destabilising existing power relations.
- **All the information of the project's technical teams was centralised at the level of the community approach team**. Moreover, the latter was the only one empowered to disseminate the messages to the population. This enabled it to master all the project's activities and to be able to convey clear and unambiguous information to the population. In the same way, the community approach team was in charge of reporting information, complaints and feedbacks from the inhabitants to the project managers, and of monitoring the responses given.
- **The implementation of "immersed" mobilisers<sup>6</sup>** made it possible to create strong links with residents. Their constant presence and interventions helped to ease any tensions.
- **Multiplication of communication mechanisms with the community**: monthly information meeting, consultation workshops on the results of technical studies, on choices and proposals, local meetings, festive events... The community

approach team had a list of contacts which was regularly updated. These contacts received a text message before each meeting or other important information. Posters were also posted at various locations in the neighbourhood.

- **The installation of a decentralised SI office in the centre of the district** to ensure permanent staff, inform and listen to anyone with questions, complaints or suggestions.

## Difficulties

- **Misunderstanding about partners' work**: the community approach team was not clearly aware of the work of the partners doing the housing activities, including Build Change, and was therefore unable to communicate with the community before the works started. Build Change was repeatedly taken to task by the neighbours of the rehabilitated housing units, although they intervened only on the technical component of the construction sites (did not have any view on the selection of housing units). It would have been necessary to facilitate communication between the community approach team and all partners (even if consultant, as was the case with Build Change) so that the right messages could be passed on.

5. Referring inhabitants were a group of people from all over the district interested in participating in the consultation. The maximum number of participants was not limited, and their "recruitment" was communicated throughout the neighbourhood through posters, a festive event and word of mouth. This sample was intended to be much larger and more open than a community platform and allowed us to obtain a very broad range of profiles in Christ Roi.
6. Community mobilisers spent their days in the neighbourhood creating social bonds, discussing, informing and answering questions from the residents. They knew the inhabitants, their families, their difficulties and aspirations well. This systematic presence and their ability to listen enabled them to create a relationship of trust.

## Lessons learned

- **A phase of recognition of the zone, groups of people and power relations present, and understanding of its history** is essential in the introduction to any urban development project in a district. This first phase should also be used to establish contacts and build relationships of trust with the resource persons in the area and the community at large.
- **Identify the different phases of the project in order to limit expectations and frustrations**. The launch of the project with great pomp in the neighbourhood prior to the start of the participatory workshops for the implementation of the development plan generated many expectations and, consequently, frustration among the population. This type of project should take place in two phases: a first phase of urban planning, which controls the expectations thus created, with more conditional communication, and a second phase of implementation of the various activities.
- **It is essential to find the right way to face the community in urban development projects**. This way of doing community mobilisation needs to be studied more carefully as it depends very much on the context and dynamics of the neighbourhood.
- **The community approach as envisaged and implemented by SI made it possible to avoid any conflict with the community**. It was a real success and a great added value for the project. It appears to be a sine qua non condition for any long-term project.
- **The multiplication of channels and relays of communication** keeping informed a maximum of inhabitants of the district proves to be particularly beneficial.
- **Prior to the project, think about the appropriate organisational chart for the team**, the hierarchical and functional relationships and the work and communication patterns, especially concerning the place of the community approach team within the project team as a whole. The operational organisation chart must give the community approach team a central and transversal place so that it is able to centralise the information needed for the development of the messages to be transmitted, including to the consortium partners.
- **The immersion of the community approach team** in the neighbourhood allowed them to keep an eye on what was happening in the district, but also to keep an ear on how the messages passed are interpreted and circulated.



## Strengths and good practices

- **Operational objective:** the inclusion of public institutions was one of the results of the project.
- **The development plan** produced by SI was the first of its kind to be validated by the technical committee composed of the institutions. Similarly, the memorandum of understanding and the work plan developed with the MTPTC served as models; they were taken up by other PARAQ programme operators.
- **The designation of the MTPTC as the contracting authority and SI as delegated project manager:** this not only made it possible to respect everyone's roles and responsibilities, but also provided SI with a great deal of tranquillity. More generally, the presence of the institutions and their role within the project ensured an operational "protection" vis-à-vis the populations. The MTPTC or the City Council were responsible for the various projects implemented. If there were demands, it was up to the public authorities to manage them. Moreover, this formalisation of roles and responsibilities helped to establish trusting relationships with the institutions.
- **Reinforced presence of the institutions in the district:** one or more representatives of the City Council being very regularly present at community meetings, links between the inhabitants and public authorities were established. Beyond that, the project allowed the City Council to return to the district, as it was not accepted there before the project.
- **Supporting public authorities and involving the population in the processes of analysis and urban planning,** so that they can develop realistic territorial planning based on an informed population.
- In order to avoid conflicts that would have occurred over land tenure problems, **SI put forward the State.** For example, it was the City Council that managed the discussions and negotiations with the owners of the houses that had to be demolished in order to carry out the ravine works.

## Lessons learned

- Good communication with institutions partly due to the teams' **mastery of the vocabulary of the urban environment** and a good understanding of their roles and functioning.
- **The formalisation of roles and responsibilities** is an essential step for urban development projects.
- Land tenure is more a barrier to intervention in urban areas. There is a need to **learn more about existing informal land management mechanisms** and to reflect on the social customs that make up the legality of a parcel of land while having a good knowledge of the legal aspects. Collaboration with institutions is also essential to find a joint solution to this problem.
- When designing and implementing our projects/programmes, special care must be taken to **respect the prerogatives of the institutions**, clearly positioning SI's action as support to the effective execution of their missions.

## Difficulties

- **The question of the identity of the interlocutors** was perhaps sometimes too decisive. Relations with representatives of the institutions were sometimes too dependent on persons. People's human qualities and the degree of involvement and motivation of people can be opportunities as well as barriers.
- While unconditional State support is in principle required in the process of drawing up a development plan, **continuity was not always guaranteed** (an elected official may decide not to rely on the development plan to carry out work in a neighbourhood).

“ We never felt like we were being stepped on. We were respected as an institution responsible for the sector, while taking care to maintain a professional relationship.

– Engineer Alfred Piard, Director of the Public Works Department of the MTPTC

## Les relations

### institutionnelles





# and construction

## Role of partners:

**EdM:** upgrading and new constructions in wood-frame, wood frame trainings

**GRET:** new masonry construction

**Build Change:** reinforcement, training in chained masonry and reinforcement techniques

## Achievements:

**52 reinforced housing units**

**6 wooden frame extensions**

**8 reconstructed housing units**

**54 builders certified by Build Change**

“ The training of artisanal masons in chained masonry construction principles and seismic and paracyclonic construction techniques promotes sustainable change in construction practices in Haiti.

- Aline Séjourné, Build Change

2013

### April – June 2013: study on the financing of housing, carried out by GRET

The objective of the study is to propose a pilot tool for financing new housing to meet the repair and construction needs of a larger number of households. This scheme was supposed to combine subsidies, the owner's contribution and housing credit.

### September 2013: integration of new partners for the housing activities

The FAU was initially responsible for this component of activities. However, following the differences in the definition of the methodology for the construction and repair of housing and the impossibility to find a compromise, it was decided that the FAU would not carry out these activities. SI launches a restricted call for proposals to take over some of the activities not covered. Entrepreneurs du Monde (EdM) responds to this call in September 2013, in partnership with GRET and Build Change. Activities under this component began once the first amendment was signed with the European Union (28 April 2014).

2014

### June 2014: census of the state of housing around the ravine: 487 buildings identified

Housing construction activities focus on areas designated as strategic by the development plan, particularly around Ravine Nicolas. The housing strategy is therefore designed according to the objectives of urban restructuring in the district, and not according to the characteristics of the beneficiaries (vulnerable, tenants, displaced people, etc.). This is also a wish of the UCLBP.

Build Change and EdM conduct a survey of the condition of the housing units 30 metres on either side of the ravine in June 2014. 487 buildings are listed. Only 372 files are completed (lack of one or more information on the rest, owners are not reachable). 156 out of 372 buildings are likely to be reinforced, representing 267 households (an average of 1.7 households per building).

EdM and Build Change also choose to prioritise the technical studies by potential consolidation zone: the idea is to work on the reconstruction or reinforcement of groups of houses in order to combine urban development works (re-organisation to create a small public spaces, enlarge corridors, add sanitation systems).

### Summer 2014: first reorientation of housing actions

It is suggested that housing activities are concentrated on potential beneficiaries whose homes can receive both seismic reinforcement or reconstruction and be connected to a collective sanitation network. In order to increase the impact of the action, the objective is to propose an integrated action linking the WaSH and housing components.

### 17 September 2014: opening of Build Change's training centre

The new training centre opens in the offices of Build Change in the neighbouring district. Training courses on chained masonry and reinforcement techniques are given, based on the construction site / school format. The trainers then follow the participants on site to ensure that the skills are acquired and put into practice. Of the 68 masons eligible for training, 54 are certified.

2014

**September – December 2014: identification of housing**

Following the reorientation of the housing strategy, between September and December, the three partners in the housing component carry out an identification of housing units that could both be strengthened and benefit from a collective sanitation system.

**December 2014 – January 2016: self-constructed house constructions, upgrades and reinforcements**

The priority dwellings having been identified, BC and EdM carry out a first selection of the buildings that can benefit from either a reinforcement, a wooden frame raising or a chain masonry reconstruction.

2015

**January 2015:** The partners must integrate an additional criterion for the houses to be rebuilt, which is the development needs of the Nicolas ravine. This corresponds to a third reorientation of the housing strategy.

**28 January 2015:** awareness day on seismic constructions organised by SI and the MTPTC

**30 March 2015**

The second amendment to the contract with the European Union takes into account the new housing strategy by combining the infrastructure, housing and sanitation components for an integrated approach.

**May 2015: beginning of the training sessions on wood-frame construction by EdM**

Training courses in wood-frame construction are provided directly on site by members of the ATPROCOM association (professional association supported by EdM).

**August 2015:** certification ceremony of the craftsmen masons trained by Build Change

2016

**February 2016:** official end of the housing activities

**Assisted self-construction: a way of fully integrating people into the reconstruction process**

The National Housing and Urban Development Policy, drawn up by UCLBP, focuses most of its strategy on self-construction, affirming that housing construction is the responsibility of families. This implies that the owners and not the operators take the position of project managers. The latter provide the families concerned with technical assistance in designing, cost quantification and monitoring the works, as well as with financial assistance...

As part of the project, BC prepared the technical files for the housing units concerned and transferred them to an EdM administrative officer, who assessed the financial feasibility of the project on the basis of the average amount of subsidies that could be awarded. Once the administrative file was complete, a first installment was made to purchase the materials. The owner had to find a foreman (in the list proposed by EdM of masons trained in seismic construction). While the construction works were carried out, a BC engineer regularly checked the correct implementation. At the end of each work phase, EdM collected the purchase invoices and made the next disbursement until the end of the works, which was made official by means of a receipt slip from BC to EdM.


2,500 USD per reinforced housing unit, 4,500 USD per upgraded housing unit and 7,700 USD per newly built housing unit were granted.

“Housing strategies should not be based on the characteristics of the beneficiaries but on the urban restructuring objectives of the neighbourhood.

– Simon Deprez, architect consultant for the writing of the housing strategy

## Strengths and good practices

- **Housing strategy reflections based on the objectives of neighbourhood restructuring.** Housing construction operations are integrated into the neighbourhood's development logic: they are concentrated on areas designated as strategic by the development plan, and on consolidation zones to optimise the space and improve the surrounding public spaces (enlargement of corridors, etc.). Interlinks are thus created between the different issues.
- **Solicitation of the MTPTC for the technical validation of the treated files,** whether it is for reinforcements, chained masonry constructions or wood-frame constructions. The interventions on housing were also in line with the national policy: operationalisation of the constructions carried out according to the standards of the National Building Code of Haiti, granting subsidies of an amount determined by the UCLBP, and according to the principle of self-construction promoted by the latter.
- **Promotion of two earthquake and cyclone resistant construction methods:** chained masonry, which requires small changes at little or no cost to existing masonry construction practices; and wood-frame construction, which allows for lighter elevations on the concrete slab of a chained masonry. Training in chained masonry and reinforcement techniques was particularly successful, with 80% of the masons who were certified.



## Difficulties

- **Withdrawal of the FAU:** due to misunderstandings about the methodology to be used, collaboration with FAU on the housing component was discontinued. This withdrawal did not give rise to any increase in the budget earmarked for housing activities, whereas this component was subsequently financed by 3 NGOs over a longer period of time.
- **Hesitations on the strategy and reduction of the number of housing units (from 175 to 65)** impacted by the works on the ravine and effectively taken in charge. This reduction had at least two reasons: the partners could not wait until the end of the ravine clearing to work on the housing and the costs of reinforcing and rebuilding the houses in question far exceeded the maximum subsidy planned (USD 2,500 per housing unit for reinforcement). Reflections and hesitations caused delays to be lengthened, resulting in a reduction in the number of housing units treated, which weakened and reduced the impact and visibility of the housing component.
- **Failure of the innovative financing method for households** (aligning subsidy, contribution of the owner and housing loan): the amounts proposed were insufficient to meet the ambitions of the owners. No household followed up on this financing arrangement.
- **Very little success in the training of wood-frame masons:** none of them took part in the whole training (judged too long: several weeks full time while most of them already had a professional activity) and therefore none of them could be certified. Moreover, the social factor has probably been underestimated, as the beneficiaries have little appreciation for wood construction, associating it with "rural architecture" and preferring concrete, despite its lower cost. It is possible that few other buildings of this type appear in the neighbourhood.

## Lessons learned

- **Strong and clear coordination:** while the relevance of an integrated action between different components (housing / sanitation / ravine...) was clearly confirmed, the operation also demonstrated how much a solid coordination was needed even before the beginning of the activities because of the interdependence of the activity components. From the outset, the action plan and the means of implementation must have clear contents. The leading NGO must have a person capable of making the necessary technical and operational housing decisions.
- **Build Change's "owner-centered" reconstruction approach allows for real ownership, participation and satisfaction of the owner.** Many lessons learned on this approach are available on their website.
- **Test the "housing loan" product:** to carry out this test will require in the future that the grant disbursement be conditional on a contribution from the family (the grant must be calculated not in absolute value but as a maximum percentage of the cost of the work).
- **To fight against the importation into urban areas of rural housing modes,** and therefore to think about urban housing modes: block apartment of 2 or 3 floors (grouped housing via reparcelling), common ownership, co-ownership, use and responsibility of semi-private spaces...



2013

**20 June 2013: land tenure issue on the basketball court project in 1<sup>st</sup> ruelle Nazon**

A landlord shows up and asks for \$25,000 for the community use of the space in 1<sup>st</sup> ruelle Nazon. The impossibility of finding an acceptable mechanism on land tenure for all the stakeholders forces SI not to invest EU funds on this project; the funds allocated to it are redirected towards the Nicolas ravine security project and the compensation of the owners impacted by these works.

**November 2013: installation of a tap-tap stand**

An action identified and planned in the development plan to help improve the accessibility issue in the neighbourhood, the creation of a tap-tap stop at the entrance to Monplaisir Street has helped to clear the “Samida crossroads” as well as the entrance to this street.

2014

**February – May 2014: start of the electrification works on Monplaisir street**

Following a needs assessment carried out in the Monplaisir area, the importance of formal electrification of the area is confirmed [92% of respondents considered this development to be their highest priority]. SI then approached Electricité d’Haïti (EDH) to make the connections of households that had applied for it. EDH came to raise awareness among residents of the billing system and good practices for responsible electricity consumption. In January 2014, some 100 applications were submitted. The installation works end on May 30<sup>th</sup> 2014.

**March 2014: start of development works in the Bas Norguès zone**

The development of the Bas Norguès zone is one of 5 priority projects in the development plan because it represents several issues at the neighbourhood level: the development of sports fields meets the need for this type of infrastructure, and intervention at the road level improves the sanitation and accessibility of this zone. The nature and characteristics of the public space are identified with the residents near the facility, then validated by the MTPTC and the City Council. Following the call for tender in February, the works begin with the rehabilitation of 70 linear metres of road and a bridge crossing the ravine. As prime contractor, the MTPTC accompanies SI in the follow-up and supervision of works.

**May 2014: authorisation from the City Council and start of the construction works on the multi-sport field**

The space belongs to the Private domain of the State, which is managed by the Port-au-Prince City Council. The latter grants a building permit and its authorisation for a period of 1 year renewable each year. The firm ESCA carries out the construction works.

**22 August – November 2014: corridor rehabilitation project** (initiative and community contract)

**11 September – November 2014: construction project of a water kiosk** (initiative and community contract)

**12 November 2014: inauguration of the sports field in Bas Norguès**

The facility is inaugurated on November 12<sup>th</sup> in the presence of the EU, the MTPTC, the Port-au-Prince City Council and the UCLBP. Today, the field is managed by an association created for the occasion by local residents.

2016

**January – March 2016: construction of Maxi courtyard**

In direct connection with housing activities, an undeveloped space could be created in the centre of an operation to raise several dwellings. The community approach team works with local residents to mobilise them around this project; they participate in its design and decoration.

**Activities implemented by SI****Achievements:**

diverses technical studies

road and bridge rehabilitation in Bas Norguès

1 multi-sports ground in Bas Norgues

Monplaisir street electrification

1 tap-tap stand

construction of Maxi courtyard

86 trees planted

43 indication boards

“ The expected result of PARAQ was not so much the completion of the works themselves as the modification of the urban dynamics to which these works will contribute.

- Benjamin Biscan, Urban Coordinator from May 2014 to October 2015

Activities implemented by SI (delegated project manager), MTPTC (contracting authority), LUPP et SECCA (construction firms)

## Achievements:

514 linear meters secured

7 footbridges built

“ The choice to intervene on the ravine had several spans: risk management, improving mobility in the neighbourhood, sanitation, opening up the area... in short, improving the neighbourhood's image.

- Gerald Nogar, Urban Coordinator Assistant

2013

### August - September 2013: réalisation des études techniques

Conduction of the technical studies for the intervention on the Nicolas ravine: a hydrological model (to evaluate the volume of water carried by the ravine and delimit flood zones), a geophysical and geotechnical study (to characterise the nature of the soil and subsoil), and the plans and dimensioning of the structure.

2014

### March - April 2014: topographic survey of the ravine

The route of the ravine is defined in conjunction with the MTPTC and the community in order to impact as little housing as possible.

### 16 April 2014: validation of the route and technical solutions for the intervention on the Nicolas ravine by the MTPTC

The results of the studies, route options (existing and "ideal" route) and technical planning solutions (bottom of the ravine in natural terrain or concrete slab, walls in masonry, reinforced concrete or gabions) are presented to the MTPTC. It is then decided by the MTPTC that the ravine axis should follow the existing axis as closely as possible in order to limit the impact on the surrounding constructions, the bottom of the ravine would be protected by a concrete floor and the walls would be made of rock masonry when the right-of-way allows it and of reinforced concrete if not.

### First semester 2014: start of the discussions regarding the release of rights-of-way along the ravine

The law stipulates that a 10-metre strip on either side of the ravine is defined as a flood-prone area and is therefore a non-constructible zone; these zones are in the public domain. However, several dozen dwellings encroach on this zone, and must be partially or totally demolished to allow work on the ravine. Discussions are then launched with the City Council to define the way forward.

### July 2014: marking of the rights-of-way to be released by the City Council

A team from the City Council intervenes in the ravine to mark the rights-of-way to be freed and to identify more precisely the housing units that would be affected and that should be subject to potential compensation.

### 27 November 2014: signing of the contract for the ravine works with LUPP HAITI SA and the MTPTC

The national open call for tenders for the Nicolas ravine security and development project was published in August 2014. The MTPTC contributes to the writing of the tender dossier and the study of tenders. Together with SI, they choose the company LUPP HAITI SA. The contract is tripartite, signed by MTPTC, SI and the company.

2015

### January 2015: SI - MTPTC - EU meeting on the houses built illegally along the ravine

Contrary to a classic release of rights-of-way, which concerns the appropriation of public spaces by the State for reasons of public utility, these demolitions concern illegal constructions on the public domain, and therefore cannot be the subject of declarations of public utility. At this meeting, the MTPTC proposes to adapt the mechanism of the Standing Committee of Acquisition (CPA), normally in charge of expropriations on behalf of the State, to this reality.

### 30 March 2015: amendment to the contract with the EU

The second amendment to the subsidy contract with EuropeAid formalises the compensation mechanism mentioned above: it makes it possible for SI to accompany the owners and the City Council in the release of the rights-of-way necessary for the works on the ravine.

### 5 June 2015: signature of a MoU between SI and the City Council on the compensation procedure for owners

After nearly a year of discussions and negotiations, the City Council and SI signed a Memorandum of Understanding clarifying the roles and responsibilities of each party in the compensation mechanism for the 41 "assignees" concerned.

2015

**January – July 2015: 1<sup>st</sup> phase of the ravine works with LUPP HAITI SA**

The works start in January 2015. Initially planned for a duration of 8.5 months, the works had to start at both ends of the ravine and then join together. For reasons of social acceptance of the works, the choice is then made to first preserve the execution of the works by the upstream side only in order to finalise a section and thus demonstrate the work and its advantages (safety, hygiene, public spaces, economic development, etc.). Due to the slowness of the release process of the rights-of-way (demolitions and compensation of affected households), the works are slowed down and finally stopped in June 2015. Out of the 514 linear metres planned, only the first 169 metres are partially completed (clearing, preparation of the right-of-way, laying out the bed and walls of the ravine).

**11 August 2015: amicable termination of the contract with LUPP HAITI SA**

Delays in the works cause a dispute with LUPP Haiti. The latter then wishes to terminate the contract and an amicable settlement of the dispute is initiated in August 2015.

**9 October 2015: launch of a new restricted call for tenders**

After 2 months of interruption on the ravine project until the SI - LUPP HAITI SA dispute is settled, the technical and administrative documents are validated by the MTPTC to launch a second tender. The decision is then taken to reduce the volume of activity to be carried out on the ravine (from 500 to 279 metres), the project having already fallen far behind and the financial pressure beginning to be felt.

2016

**20 April 2016: signature of the contract with SECCA Ingénierie S. A.**

Following a joint technical and financial analysis with the MTPTC of the four tenders and negotiations of the companies that responded to the call for tenders, the choice is made on the Haitian company SECCA Ingénierie S. A. The contract is drawn up on the basis of a mechanism of firm and conditional sections depending on the financing available: a firm section (finalisation of the first 169 metres) and 7 conditional sections.

**Compensation for owners along the ravine: a multiparty collaboration**

The restitution process involved several stakeholders:

- SI, in charge of providing the full amount of compensation paid to the assignees,
- the City Council, which ensured that the transactions went smoothly and was in charge of negotiating with the owners of the accommodation,
- a notary, in charge of officialising the owners, validating the contracts of arrangement amicably between the City Council and the owners, handing over to them the negotiated amounts in the conditions of the contract, and paying all the legal taxes,
- the CPA, composed of 8 members, including representatives of the MTPTC, in charge of estimating the maximum amount of compensation for each owner.

The owners themselves had to demolish the parts of their dwelling located on public property. The compensation was paid in two instalments, the first before the destruction of their property and the second after a notary witnessed the release of the right-of-way. The amounts ranged from \$25,000 to \$150,000.





ravine

Nicolas



2016

**May 2016: start of the 2<sup>nd</sup> phase of the ravine works**

The contract between MTPTC, SI and SECCA is signed in May 2016. Completion of the work was then scheduled for September 30<sup>th</sup> 2016. This contract includes a mechanism of firm and conditional sections which must be confirmed by SI according to the progress of the work and the financing available.

**9 June 2016: 1<sup>st</sup> amendment to the contract**

Revision of the amount of pre-financing granted to SECCA

**7 July 2016: 2<sup>nd</sup> amendment to the contract**

Reset of the contract (due to the Gourde's devaluation) by 10% for all tranches, and extension of the contract term to October 2016.

**22 November 2016: 3<sup>rd</sup> amendment to the contract**

Re-definition of conditional tranches: prioritisation of certain activities following the clearing of the bottom of the ravine, which has exacerbated the vulnerability of some dwellings in order to secure all of these dwellings, and identification of activities considered to be of lower priority and to be carried out in a second stage according to the available funding (footbridges and development of ravine banks). Contract extension to March 21, 2017

2017

**5 April 2017: 4<sup>th</sup> amendment to the contract**

Extension of the implementation schedule to August 31<sup>st</sup> 2017

**6 April 2017: 5<sup>th</sup> amendment to the contract**

Re-adjustment of the sections to balance the cost of the works

**31 August 2017: completion of the ravine works**

“ [In Port-au-Prince], ravines are at the heart of communities, it is a 'must' if you want to improve the life of a neighbourhood. To transform a neighborhood, you have to start with that.

- Engineer Alfred Piard, Director of the Public Works Department of the MTPTC

## Strengths and good practices

- **Strong involvement and institutional support** on land issues: allocation of building permits and handling of the compensation files for the houses on the ravine by the City Council, monitoring, verification and follow-up of building sites by the MTPTC [see page 11].
- **Strategic choice to integrate different stakes and axes of development within the infrastructure projects:** interventions at the level of the ravine and at Bas Norguès have thus made it possible to serve different objectives: accessibility, mobility, sanitation, economic development, housing, security, leisure... In order to avoid a scattering of infrastructure activities throughout the neighbourhood, the action has been limited to “compound” projects, responding simultaneously to several development issues, and possibly playing a “triggering” role, to initiate a neighbourhood planning process and community life.
- **Significant convergence of the intervention carried out at the level of the ravine:** ravines are places of concentration of risks (flood, landslide, insalubrity, etc.) and have an important function in Haiti (vertebral columns of the neighbourhoods). SI's project intervened at this level by securing the ravine and thereby reducing these risks. In addition, the opportunity was also taken to integrate other issues into this project (housing and sanitation activities).
- **Voluntary distance taken with the community management of the works:** worksite monitoring committees were set up for the different worksites (ravine, sports ground, pits...) by the City Council in conjunction with the construction firm. These committees were responsible for recruiting labour within the neighbourhood and “securing” the site (avoiding looting). SI did not wish to have a say in the composition and role of these committees. By staying away from this system, SI was able to avoid community conflicts.



## Lessons learned

- **The need to formalise through memoranda of understanding the roles and responsibilities of each party during major works:** the case of the ravine, for example, and compensation for homeowners affected by these works. The City Council, the MTPTC and the operator SI each had their own role to play, which guaranteed the smooth running of the operation. Very few complaints were made throughout the operation.
- Because the houses in question were partly located on a non-constructible public space, the City Council, the MTPTC and SI could have imposed the demolition of the houses without compensation, but this would have sparked serious conflicts. Negotiation did not create tension in the community and did not break the trusting relationships established. The City Council, via the Standing Committee of Acquisition, managed the relationship between the notary and the landlords; **SI was therefore not involved in the negotiations.**

## Difficulties

- **Lack of experience in large civil engineering works:** the works carried out with the MTPTC were unprecedented in SI and involved significant financial risks. There was no expertise at headquarters and the mission was autonomous on these issues. Headquarters depended on what the mission proposed and could not assist project teams in finding solutions to the problems encountered.
- **Absence of a second level of technical validation:** in fact, the headquarters was unable to verify the construction options and provisions of the works. These decisions were concentrated at the level of one person on the mission, with the support of the MTPTC. The legal implications were not taken into account or anticipated and their management was therefore very complicated.
- **Lack of a clear strategy regarding the release of the rights-of-way:** compensation for housing affected by the ravine works was not considered eligible by the EU. Because of schedule constraints, SI contracted with the construction firm without being sure of the strategy to be implemented for these dwellings. This mismanagement led to significant delays in carrying out the works and a “snowball” effect on other housing and corridor development activities.
- **Importance of land issues in this type of project:** urban development and housing projects are faced with land problems (absence of cadastre, illegal occupation of land, lack of clear guidelines from municipal or national authorities...). Despite a study of the land status of the various plots of land on which SI wished to intervene, owners sometimes showed up at the last moment (for example, for the public space project on the 1st ruelle Nazon). The project of a market on Christ Roi Street could not succeed because of lack of title deeds and of insufficient space.
- **Complexity of works on the ravine:** this project concentrated a large number of technical challenges and implementation difficulties.
- **Administrative procedures with the City Council for the financial compensations** were particularly time-consuming, which contributed to delaying the development works.

- **Difficulty in anticipating land tenure problems in Haiti:** there is a need to maintain a leeway in case such problems arise. The institutions must be involved in this issue. It is possible to appeal to the government to declare a property in public utility and thus reduce the landowner's claims by measuring the risk of being out of touch with the community. It is also possible to carry out a social identification of land, reflecting on the social customs that make up the legality of a plot.
- **The importance of planning and anticipating technical visits** from the design stage of the project if the headquarters cannot rely on a specific competence (e.g. civil engineering).
- **The management and maintenance of the public spaces** created must be considered and anticipated, whether they are managed in a community manner or by public authorities. This ensures a certain durability.



**Activities implemented by SI****Achievements:**

1 sanitation plan

218 households connected to  
11 sanitation systems

79% of the rebuilt houses are  
equipped with a sanitation  
solution (no technical feasibility  
or refusal of the owners for the  
remaining 21%)

“ The AIR networks have been a technical success. However, more time would be needed to support the committees and users at least until the first desludging and maintenance works are carried out in order to support them and to ensure the proper functioning of the payment system.

- Emilie Vautravers, Programme  
Coordinator since June 2016

**2013****May 2013: writing the sanitation plan**

It was based on bibliographical work, meetings with the authorities, a survey of 300 households, field visits, infiltration tests, measurements of the water table...

**26 July 2013: presentation of the sanitation plan to the DINEPA**

This document provides the municipality of Port-au-Prince with a waste water management plan for its territory. It is also a reference document for DINEPA.

**20 September 2013: validation of the sanitation plan by the technical committee, together with the development plan****November 2013**

First call for interest from interested households to receive an individual sanitation solution. 3 mini-sewerage networks (Grouped Individual Sanitation or AIR in French) bringing together a total of 34 households and an individual sanitation solution were identified.

**2014****January 2014**

2<sup>nd</sup> call for interest to identify 3 other AIR solutions, bringing together 76 households.

**April 2014**

Launch of a call for demonstrations to residents and businesses interested in initiating solid waste management activities in Christ Roi.

**June 2014**

Joint visit with DINEPA to identify leaks on the network in the district and connection opportunities for a fountain. Most of the leaks identified by the Technical Operations Centre were outside the intervention zone, and among those located in Christ Roi, the total amount of the cost estimation did not allow SI to finance all of them.

**August 2014**

Presentation of 3 of the 5 dossiers selected to enter the training process for the business plan of solid waste management companies, given by EdM. Unfortunately, none of them reached economic equilibrium before 3 years of operation and with many reservations. No projects were thus selected.



2014

## January – August 2014: 1<sup>st</sup> construction phase of AIR solutions

The 6 AIR semi-collective networks and the individual sanitation solution are built and connect 112 families, or 532 people.

2015

## February 2015

Beginning of a collective reflection between the partners, Global Communities (formerly CRF, also present in the area), the Metropolitan Solid Waste Collection Service (SMCRS), pre-identified entrepreneurs, neighbourhood associations and local collection networks, to conduct a joint solid waste management project on a larger area. The objective was to support small neighbourhood associations for garbage collection at several identified collection points, which would then be collected by a SMCRS truck.

## August – December 2015

Global Communities and SI supported two neighbourhood associations in the second half of 2015. Their projects included raising awareness of solid waste management and the installation of public garbage cans. They held numerous community events, with 40 sensitizers deployed three times a week. However, the waste management platform proposed by these two associations could not be set up due to the SMCRS' lack of investment.

2016

## September 2015 – February 2016: second construction phase of AIR solutions

4 other AIR networks are built, allowing 106 families to be connected, i. e. 374 people.

## Sanitation in urban contexts

Set up in close collaboration with DINEPA, AIR systems are complete systems including effluent collection and treatment. The principle of multi-family sanitation is to organise the collection of waste water from the housing units to a small-scale treatment plant downstream. The collection network comprises a private and a public part. The pits are intended for emptying after 3 years. A multifamily system costs half as much as an individual system. It is 5 times cheaper than the investment, but maintenance is more expensive (especially the desludging). The community committees set up must collect dues, maintain the network (public part) and empty the pits.

The DINEPA operates on the same philosophy of self-construction support as the UCLBP. The project thus sought to stimulate demand for household sanitation and break with a "wait-and-see" system. Calls for interest were launched for applicant households to gather in committees and take charge of the construction of the pits. Committees must take ownership and manage the public portion of the networks over the long term.



# and waste

## Sanitation

### Strengths and good practices

- **Community mobilisation** linked to works and waste management was a very important dimension of the sanitation component to ensure ownership of the problem. This aspect was the result of the collaboration between the WaSH technical team and the community approach team.
- **Multi-family systems are a real solution for dense urban areas**, emphasising measures to be applied “at source” (at the household level) and in the absence of sewage at all. This sanitation system allows several households to independently treat domestic wastewater before it is discharged into the ravine. It also saves space.

### Difficulties

- **Difficult access to land:** concerning multifamily sanitation in dense urban areas, it is necessary to find available spaces to build pits. This is a real technical challenge: either the space belongs to someone and he has to donate it to the community, or it is public and it needs an authorisation from the City Council.
- **Support of committees too short:** the time spent training and accompanying the committees (less than one year) did not allow for a good appropriation of the works and a functional mechanism of fees.
- **Dependence on waste collection by public authorities:** the project envisaged the creation of a community platform that would bring waste together at collection points to be recovered by SMCRS refuse trucks. However, despite the advocacy actions carried out by SI and Global Communities, SMCRS, which was initially involved in the launch day of the waste management campaign with its road trucks to clean up the neighbourhood, subsequently withdrew from the collaboration due to a change of management and a lack of resources (logistics and finances).
- **Impossibility to ensure the quality of discharges:** the measurement of effluent treatment parameters (DBO5, COD, etc.) before they are discharged to the natural environment (the ravine) was not possible due to the lack of analysis laboratories in the country. The teams were therefore not able to confirm the bacteriological quality of the sludge on some parameters and therefore the proper functioning of the system.

### Lessons learned

- **Ensuring good governance on the part of the committee:** it is important to train and accompany in order to create a trusting relationship and exchange between the committee and users. This will condition the users' sense of involvement and consequently the long term management of the pits.
- **Community takeover of AIR systems:** a much longer support, at least until the first desludging of the pits, should be considered to manage the costs associated with desludging with the committee and users. There are many constraints on payment mechanisms and committees are struggling to implement them. With longer follow-up, they would be supported to manage the desludging and maintenance.
- **It would be interesting to see which type of committee works and allows for greater sustainability:** existing associations or associations created by the project, small or large number of connected households? Better results are achieved with existing committees, rather than the newly created ones which are less legitimate and therefore less recognised by the community.

2013

**April – June 2013**

Diagnosis on the economic activities in Christ Roi by GRET

**25 July 2013: start of business support services provided by Entrepreneur du Monde to inform and support the economic actors of the district**

EdM, the partner in charge of the economic development component, opened a permanent office twice a week in the SI office in Christ Roi to welcome, guide and register interested economic actors to participate in credit facilitation and support programmes.

2014

**January 2014 – December 2015: support of project holders**

EdM supported the economic development of the neighbourhood in two ways:

» By training and referring small-scale informal traders (mainly women small traders) to microfinance institutions, including Palmis Mikwofinans Sosyal, a scheme of the partner to offer loans, savings, training and social support services to microentrepreneurs. It is therefore a matter of training support, not financial support.

» By supporting start-ups and developing companies through EdM's "Dare the Enterprise" (Osez l'entreprise) scheme. This personalised support system is intended for creators of very small formal enterprises, employing between 1 and 10 employees and with an annual turnover of less than 5 million gourdes (€67,000).

The EdM selection committee meet 16 times between November 2013 and August 2015 to validate or not the companies on the basis of their business plan. A total of 25 craftsmen and entrepreneurs are supported to create or develop their businesses. The loans granted vary between 30,000 and 296,000 HTG (between €590 and €5,850). At the time, 21 of these companies in operation allow the creation or perpetuation of 62 jobs.

**April – August 2014**

Joint call for interest launched by EdM and SI to set up waste management companies. Following a training course on how to write a business plan, 3 "waste" business plans are presented to SI in August, but no project is selected (see page 19).

2015

**December 2015: end of the economic development activities**

The repayment rate of the businesses is 50% on average. By December 31st 2015, 80% of the companies financed are still in operation and are even substantially increasing their turnover.

**Activities implemented by EdM****Achievements:**

**1 economic diagnosis**

**150 trained traders**

**25 traders with a loan**

“An economic development component must be integrated from the outset of such a project. It is relevant because it stimulates real neighbourhood dynamics.

– Marie-Hermine de Montangon,  
Programme Coordinator at  
Entrepreneurs du Monde



# development

## Economic



### Strengths and good practices

- The **economic study** carried out by GRET was an essential part of the project. It is essential before any economic intervention in a neighbourhood in order to better understand the different economic actors involved, institutions and sectors. It also provides a better understanding of the profiles of traders and entrepreneurs and their specific needs in order to better guide and adapt the support mechanism to be provided.
- **Flexibility of the partnership with EdM:** the collaboration was based on a real trusting relationship. It enabled EdM to implement its support and continuous monitoring mechanisms. The community approach team and one person from EdM would communicate about economic development activities with the community, then EdM would screen (depending on the relevance, feasibility of the project and capacity of the person) and refer the applicant to a micro-credit agency.
- The work with the community approach team was beneficial in carrying out economic development activities.
- Specific follow-up of the restaurant owners supported under the project to switch to environmentally beneficial equipment (improved heaters or gas stoves). The reduction of coal consumption is a real saving for the restaurant owner, reducing the impact on the environment and health.

### Difficultés

- **Many constraints in the “waste” business plans presented:** too much fundings needed, need for an operating subsidy for the first year and support for the purchase or lease of land. Since SI could not meet these constraints, the activity was transformed into support to local committees on awareness raising and waste collection.
- **Abandonment of the reinforcement of the 3 sectors identified as promising,** urban agriculture, waste management and construction, for the following reasons: lack of interest of nurseries to enter into a process of development of activities through credit, lack of viability of waste management projects, etc. It should also be noted that the development of networks is difficult to achieve at the neighbourhood level.
- • **The activity aimed at facilitating access to credit and accompanying small informal traders has not always been successful.** Many of them had difficulty understanding the benefits of training without financial compensation. Furthermore, half of the merchants had not indicated that they had already used formal credits at the beginning of their training, expecting to obtain a grant; they were therefore not interested in being referred to a microfinance institution. 108 of these traders have been trained and informed about the loan conditions of microfinance institutions.

### Lessons learned

- Despite the abandonment of the focus on promising sectors, the approach of knowing the sectors and their value chain in the district was interesting and deserves to be highlighted. This strategy makes it possible to switch from an offer-based approach to a demand-driven approach. According to the GRET, the challenge is to be able to be facilitators by providing methodological support to strengthen local actors in the implementation of their projects.
- It would have been appropriate to concentrate the activities of the economic development component on the ravine zone, so that the integrated approach with other activities would have had a leverage effect on the neighbourhood.

## Human resources

- The **intervention framework requires a certain flexibility** and the ability to reflect over the months on **possible adjustments in terms of human resources**: profiles, expertise, time commitment, contractual conditions.... It is necessary to recruit people who are ready to commit for a long period of time (minimum two years) in order to avoid too large a turnover which would harm the good maintenance of relations with the various stakeholders and the strategic vision of the project.
- It is necessary to **acquire and plan the technical means and the time needed to define the strategy of action in the neighbourhood**. SI must then broaden its areas of expertise or develop partnerships with specialists to achieve complementarity of skills. This approach requires careful consideration of the operational partnerships to be established and together upstream, the strategies to be adopted, in order to prevent unpleasant surprises at best.
- Provide an **M&E and knowledge manager** for such projects over a long period of time, as the number of data to be processed, practices to be documented, indicators to be reported and quality issues are considerable.

## Community mobilisation

- A way must be found to **establish an official dialogue with the community, no matter what form it takes**. Context plays an essential role and needs to be studied with the help of social engineering experts (national and international) to reflect on the community approach.
- It is necessary to **encourage small works and activities to be launched by the community** so that it can promote local ownership and pride. Within the framework of the PARAQ projects, support was mainly given to small public spaces and corridor development projects. This type of initiative requires constant support for the design and dimensioning of works.

## Budget and logistics considerations

- The EU subsidy contract did not allow an increase in the budget to deal with the difficulties faced when implementing the works. The increase in construction costs and the envelope dedicated to compensating owners impacted by the ravine works led to a reduction in other project activities. **This type of subsidy contract is not suitable for large projects with strong infrastructure components.**
- For large civil engineering projects, SI must develop the capacity to set up and work with this type of contract, to adapt its procedures (or create them) and to manage legal issues. Care must be taken not to simply apply the French contractual terms and conditions (for example, contracts with flat-rate prices are not usual in Haiti).

## Advocacy

- NGOs working on urban development can play an advocacy role to **make public authorities recognise the needs or problems of communities and encourage flexibility or awareness**. Their detailed knowledge of the social fabric of a neighbourhood can enable them to defend the interests of the most vulnerable, often “drowned” in the human mass of a large city or capital.

- **Carrying out related actions to defuse the issues in the area**: despite structuring interventions for the neighbourhood, we can think of “palliative” and complementary activities to reduce certain social tensions, especially in difficult areas (with gangs for example).
- **Urban planning cannot be reduced to a mere logistical issue**: it represents real expertise, requiring an understanding of urban systems and an analysis of the working mechanisms of informal neighbourhoods. This expertise is based on very close collaboration with the communities.

# General

# recommendations



## Acronyms

BC	●	BUILD CHANGE
CIAT	●	INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR TERRITORIAL PLANNING
DINEPA	●	NATIONAL DIRECTION FOR DRINKING WATER AND SANITATION
EdM	●	ENTREPRENEURS DU MONDE
EdH	●	ELECTRICITÉ D'HAÏTI
FAU	●	FONDATION DES ARCHITECTES DE L'URGENCE
MoU	●	MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
MTPTC	●	MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS, TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS
SI	●	SOLIDARITÉS INTERNATIONALE
UCLBP	●	UNIT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOUSING AND PUBLIC BUILDINGS
WaSH	●	WATER, HYGIENE AND SANITATION

## Strategic approach and designing

- The **modalities and objectives of urban intervention must be clearly defined**. What are the solutions proposed by the NGO in relation to the identified needs? This strategic approach will therefore be the fruit of upstream reflection, with the definition of results objectives and coherent indicators based on social urban expertise.

- A **way to bring together the urban development approach and the humanitarian approach**, which are two different mechanisms, must be found. This implies adjusting its intervention to the appropriate scale (district, specific area, etc.) and intervening with vulnerable populations (which are sometimes difficult to identify in urban areas). This raises the question of profiling and the articulation between the structural adjustments to be made and the selection of the population with which to work.

- A **certain degree of operational flexibility** must be anticipated in order to deal with the unforeseen circumstances inherent in this type of project, whether at the budgetary, logistical or programmatic level. These points must be discussed upstream and agreed with the donor (contractual flexibility) in order to anticipate and act more effectively when the time comes.

- In order for an urban development project to make sense, it is necessary to **prioritise and privilege the common interest over the private or individual interest, structuring activities, large-scale projects** that can infuse development. The scattering of activities will not be enough to give an area a boost of development.

- The **planning of rapid activities** from the beginning of the intervention is essential to avoid frustrations that could arise during the long intensive phase of diagnosis, preparation and assessment of the dynamics and interlocutors of the district. These “palliative” activities (cash for work or cash for production, community initiatives, festive events, awareness-raising sessions, etc.) can encourage the adhesion and acceptance of the inhabitants.

- For this type of singular and multi-annual project, it is necessary to plan **workshops between headquarter and field levels to make progress points**, to reorientate the intervention if necessary, and to reflect on the issues and challenges ahead. Preconditions are needed to start the project, including a micro and macro monitoring mechanism and a communication mechanism between headquarters and the field. This framework also includes a reflection on consultancy and other types of contracts (skills-based sponsorship, etc.) that will have to be activated if the required skills do not exist at headquarters.

- Similarly, **coordination between partners must be well thought out upstream**, especially when the activity components overlap among partners.

- It is important to have a **good knowledge of the prerogatives of public authorities** (“mapping” of processes). Authorisation procedures can be unclear and administrative issues may be new to them, which can significantly slow down the handling of cases.

## People met and interviewed

### SI teams

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### Technical partners

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### Institutional partners

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### PARAQ operators

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